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Introduction1
The concept of subjectivity as we know it, especially since Descartes, does not
appear as such in ancient Chinese thought. In Confucius’ and his followers’
work, it can not be found anywhere: there is no universal form of subjectivity,
but always princes or subjects, parents or children, husbands or wives, elder
or younger brothers. With the exception of friendship, no social relationship
is symmetrical: there are as many kinds of subjectivity as kinds or social
relationship (五倫 wuˇlún). What comes closer to the Western notion of
1The author would like to thank Jean François Billeter for his benevolent and critical
proofreading, Marion Duquerroy and Xiè J¯ıng (谢晶) for their careful advice and patience.
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subjectivity appears much later, under the influence of Indian philosophy,
especially Buddhism.
But the fact that subjectivity is not explicitly expressed does not imply
that one can do without it. Subjectivity may remain hidden, or implicit,
awaiting to be revealed by commentators. Thus, what is in stake is not to
know if subjectivity has been theorized by Chinese thinkers, but rather to
know if sinology may use this concept as a principle when studying Chinese
classics.
This question was recently raised in the controversy between two sinolo-
gists, the Swiss Jean François Billeter (born in 1939) and the French François
Jullien (born in 1951). The general public heard of it for the first time when
Billeter’s book Contre François Jullien was published in 2006; but the con-
troversy has begun much sooner, twenty years ago, in 1989, in the French
journal Études chinoises.
Here will be briefly exposed the works of both sinologists, especially from
a methodological point of view, and then the controversies that, as we will
see, emerged quite naturally. We will finally examine if the existence of
subjectivity in ancient Chinese thought is a merely sinological question, or
more generally a philosophical one.
1 Antithetic methods
1.1 François Jullien’s conceptual method
François Jullien frequently explained why he first decided to study Chinese
thought.2 After passing the French agrégation of philosophy, intending to
know the foundations of the Western way of thinking, he planned to discover
some other ways of thinking, and wondered where he could find them. The
scope statement was to find some written culture, which would have not
been linked to our history for a long time. Biblical, Hebraic, Arabic cultures
were thus excluded. Indian culture was too close as well, Sanskrit being an
Indo-European language. And as Japanese culture was partly influenced by
China, he decided to study the later one.
“Another ways of thinking”: this idea may justifiably remind of Fou-
cault’s injunction to “think differently” (penser autrement).3 And Jullien
makes no secret of this influence: he regularly quotes the few lines Foucault
2See for example François Jullien, Conférence sur l’efficacité, Opus, reprinted in La
Philosophie inquiétée par la pensée chinoise, Paris: Seuil, 2009 (2005), p. 11; and almost
every interview with this author.
3See, among others, Michel Foucault, “Le Philosophe masqué”, in: Dits et écrits II,
1976–1988, Quarto, Paris: Gallimard, 2001 (1994), pp. 923–929, p. 929; and Michel Fou-
cault, Histoire de la sexualité, II : L’Usage des plaisirs, Tel, Paris: Gallimard, 1984, In-
troduction, pp. 16 and 19.
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wrote about Chinese heterotopia, at the beginning of Les Mots et les choses.4
Maybe Jullien’s project was also influenced by Heidegger’s questions about
Eastern tradition. China would have been for him a mean for acquiring,
by comparison, a better knowledge of Greece. When wanting to know our
actual way of thinking, Foucault had been investigating into history, com-
paring for example biology with natural history. Wanting to become aware
of the structural characteristics of European philosophy, Jullien compared
it with Chinese thought. All in all, Jullien sought in space what Foucault
sought in time.
By method, what interests Jullien is Chinese thought as a tradition,5
rather than individual thinkers as individuals. This often leads him to at-
tribute to Chinese thought what he has shown for one thinker. The book
Procès ou création is thus subtitled as An introduction to Chinese literate
thought, even though its unique object is Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı (王夫之, 1619–1692).6
Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı does not seem to be described for himself, but as an example,
as a typical case.
Intending to highlight what constitutes Chinese thought as a tradition,
Jullien almost always reads Chinese classics with the help of commentators.
As an example, the Yìj¯ıng (易經) is seen through Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s eyes in
Figures de l’immanence.7 Jullien’s goal is to show what kinds of fundamental
concepts are used by Chinese classics as well as by their commentators.
The main theses of Jullien’s work are quite well-known. The ancient
Chinese thought would be a thought of immanence, whereas European phi-
losophy has been for a long time — and maybe always is — a thought
of transcendance, be it the transcendance of God or the transcendance of
subjectivity.8 The Chinese thinkers often show continuity between oppo-
4Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, Tel, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, Preface, p. 9.
See for example Jullien, op. cit., p. 14; François Jullien, Chemin faisant. Connaître la
Chine, relancer la philosophie. Réplique à ***, L’Ordre philosophique, Paris: Seuil, 2007,
IV, p. 34; François Jullien, La Philosophie inquiétée par la pensée chinoise, Opus, Paris:
Seuil, 2009, Preface, p. iii; and many interviews with François Jullien.
5François Jullien, “La Chine au miroir de l’Occident”, in: Le Monde diplomatique (Oct.
2006), pp. 22–23, url: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2006/10/JULLIEN/14010: “I
still dare to use this word [“tradition”], against Michel Foucault’s will, because a tradition is
precisely perceived from outside.” See also François Jullien, De l’Universel, de l’uniforme,
du commun et du dialogue entre les cultures, Paris: Fayard, 2008, XIII, p. 263: this word
is relevant to compare cultures, although it is not for describing one of them from inside.
Jullien probably alludes to Foucault’s critic of the notion of “tradition,” in Michel Foucault,
L’Archéologie du savoir, NRF, Paris: Gallimard, 1969, II, i, pp. 31–32.
6François Jullien, Procès ou création. Une introduction à la pensée des lettrés chinois,
Des Travaux, Paris: Seuil, 1989.
7François Jullien, Figures de l’immanence. Pour une lecture philosophique du Yi King,
le Classique du changement, Biblio Essais, Paris: Livre de Poche, 1995 (1993).
8Especially see Jullien, Procès ou création. Une introduction à la pensée des lettrés
chinois; Jullien, Figures de l’immanence. Pour une lecture philosophique du Yi King, le
Classique du changement; François Jullien, Zhongyong. La Régulation à usage ordinaire,
Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993; and passim in Jullien’s work.
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sites, whereas the Western thought often radically distinguishes concepts, as
substance and accident, being and nothingness, time and space, etc. In par-
ticular, the ancient Chinese thought did not distinguish subject from object,
and did not conceive the notion of an abstract and universal subject.
Nevertheless, what we would like to underline is not really the thesis
to which Jullien arrives, but the method he uses. There is a few texts in
which Jullien speaks from experience, an experience which may be consid-
ered as pre-discursive; for instance, when comparing Mencius (孟子 Mèngzˇı,
380–289 BC) with Rousseau.9 But in general, Jullien avoids speaking about
experience, as well as Foucault in his Archéologie du savoir.10
Even though Jullien avoids to express this in such abstract words, he
seems to think that in a way, discurse precedes experience. Experiences are
built of words and traditions. Jullien claims for the inheritance of Nietzsche,
and reads Chinese texts as a philologist. He avoids to use the notion of
experience, which may let one think that there is something universal before
the discurse; without excluding it, Jullien refuses to presuppose it. As a
philologist, he highlights the role of words, of concepts. There is no innocent
word: if Zhua¯ngzˇı (莊子, IVth century BC) or Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı regularly use the
word of dào (道), one can suppose it is a fundamental concept, and examine
both what these occurrences have in common and what this notion may
mean in an abstract sense.
Jullien’s theory of translation is a natural consequence of his philological
method. Translation should fulfill two demands. The first one is to keep the
importance of a word: almost each time the same Chinese word is used, it
should be translated by the same French word. The second one is to keep
the relative independance of two philosophical lexicons; by using the words
of God, being, subject or some other capital concepts of Western philosophy,
we could nothing but misinterpret what makes Chinese thought special, what
constitutes it in itself. Translations must keep something idiomatic. This is
the reason why Jullien often uses French words which do not belong to the
classical philosophical lexicon, but to biology or other realms: “régulation,”11
“procès,”12 etc.
Not only Jullien finally observes no real subjectivity in ancient Chinese
thought, but the lack of subjectivity has been made possible by his method
itself. By method, Jullien has chosen to analyze Chinese thought from the
concept point of view, much more than starting from the structure of con-
science.
9François Jullien, Dialogue sur la morale, Biblio Essais, Paris: Livre de Poche, 1998
(1995), III, p. 24; VIII, pp. 78ff.
10Foucault, op. cit., I, pp. 26–27; see also II, iii, p. 64 and note 1.
11Jullien, Zhongyong. La Régulation à usage ordinaire.
12Jullien, Procès ou création. Une introduction à la pensée des lettrés chinois.
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1.2 Jean François Billeter’s cousciousness point of view
Unlike Jullien, Billeter does not study Chinese thought through a tradition.
He never uses commentators, but always reads directly the texts themselves.
Whereas Jullien partly seeks the meaning of a text in its outsides, Billeter
exclusively searches for it in its inside.
But it is not enough to say that Billeter does not study China through
a tradition: more than that, he often studies it going against the tradition.
He thus frequently severely criticizes the Chinese tradition of thought, es-
pecially among Confucianists: Mencius is not only a poor philosopher, but
a humourless hypocrite,13 while Zhu¯ Xı¯ (朱熹, 1130–1200) is a conserva-
tive ideologist.14 In this respect, Billeter’s point of view already differs from
Jullien’s, who intends to take the tradition as it is, without choosing nor
judging.
As a consequence, Billeter avoids to use classes of philosophical systems.
The term of Confucianism must be avoided, because Confucius’ thought is
very different from Mencius’, Mencius’ from Zhu¯ Xı¯’s, and Zhu¯ Xı¯’s from
Zha¯ng Zaˇi’s (張載, 1020–1077). Over more than 2000 years, the Confucean
tradition was subjected to so many interpretations, so many external influ-
ences such as Daoism or Buddhism, that speaking of “one” Confucianism
would be as deceptive as speaking of “one” platonism to involve the thoughts
of Plato, Augustine, Leibniz, Frege and Gödel in one and only one system.
The same is true concerning Daoism, even more than Confucianism.
And this seems to be a kind of bias in Billeter’s method. Going against
the Chinese tradition, which used such abstract entities as Daoism (道家 dào-
jia¯) or Confucianism (儒家 rújia¯), Billeter always speaks of mere individuals.
Not Daoism, but Zhua¯ngzˇı. Not Confucianism, but Confucius.15 And a
philosopher seems to be interesting to him as soon as he distances himself
from a school. He became aware of Confucius’ depth when he separated
him from Confucianism.16 He studied Zhua¯ngzˇı as a unique philosopher,
very different from the “Daoist” which the later commentators would have
constituted.17 And for the same reason, he could nothing but be fascinated
by the personality of Lˇı Zhì (李贄, 1527–1602), dissident philosopher who
refused the whole system of mandarinate, examinations and Confucianism.
Billeter’s first book was precisely focused on Lˇı Zhì.18 He described the
13Jean François Billeter, “Confucius : l’énigme”, in: Études sur Tchouang-tseu, Paris:
Allia, 2006, pp. 163–192, especially pp. 176–177.
14Jean François Billeter, Li Zhi, philosophe maudit (1527–1602). Contribution à une
sociologie du mandarinat chinois de la fin des Ming, Travaux de droit, d’économie, de
sociologie et de sciences politiques, Genève: Droz, 1979, II, p. 53 n. 9 and pp. 88–89.
15This separation between Confucius and Confucianism, and the claim for following the
Master against the tradition, was maybe inspired by Lˇı Zhì: ibid., ch. x, p. 212.
16Billeter, “Confucius : l’énigme”, pp. 163–164.
17Jean François Billeter, Leçons sur Tchouang-tseu, Paris: Allia, 2004 (2002), IV,
pp. 135ff.
18Billeter, Li Zhi, philosophe maudit (1527–1602). Contribution à une sociologie du
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life of this philosopher, who began as a mandarine and was recognized as
very talented. However he was putting on an act.19 Without believing in
what he wrote in his essays, he just knew what was expected from him
and came up to these expectations (a behaviour which may be common
to many examinations, in all eras and places). Instead of making the very
successful career he could have legitimately dreamt of, he chose to both leave
and denounce the system in his books A Book to Burn (1590) and A Book
to Conceal (1599).
What interested Billeter in Lˇı Zhì’s work and life was this claim for
individuality.20 He studied Lˇı Zhì using some concepts of Pierre Bourdieu’s
work, and especially the notion of “symbolic capital;”21 he had in return
some influence on Bourdieu, who entitled “A Book to Burn” the first chapter
to his own book Homo Academicus.22 Bourdieu’s concepts allow Billeter to
consider Lˇı Zhì, neither as a mere free subject, nor as totally determinated
by some kind of structures, but as an agent, located in some social field,
with which he can interact, accepting or refusing it; and also, by contrast,
to explain the conservatism of Neo-Confucianism.
Much later, when Billeter studies Zhua¯ngzˇı, the same methodological
principles may be observed. Billeter refuses to include Zhua¯ngzˇı in some
abstract notion of Daoism, and studies him as an individual, separate from
Laˇozˇı (老子) as well as from his own self-styled followers. Billeter explicitly
intends to understand Zhua¯ngzˇı better than two millenia of Chinese com-
mentaries and about three centuries of Western interpretations, going alone
against them all.23 The least we can say is that Billeter is not very sensitive
to the argument from authority.
But what is his secret? How is it that he can be so close to Zhua¯ngzˇı’s
private thoughts? Billeter’s advice seems quite simple: use your imagination,
use your experience. As an example, Billeter translates and comments a
text from Zhua¯ngzˇı (III, ii), in which a cook who perfectly handles knives
describes his art. Almost all translators make him say: “what interests
me is the Way, not mere technique.” But the very abstract notion of dào
does not really help us to understand the meaning of his words. On the
contrary, Billeter chooses to translate this sentence as “what interests me
is how things work, not mere technique.”24 The translation is much more
mandarinat chinois de la fin des Ming.
19Ibid., ch. II, p. 52–53.
20The existence of forms of subjectivity in Lˇı Zhì’s work would not be surprising: this
thinker was partly influenced by Buddhism and the “intuitionist” philosopher Wáng Yáng-
míng (王陽明, 1472–1529). See ibid., ch. II and X.
21Ibid., pp. 82ff.
22Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, Le Sens commun, Paris: Minuit, 1984.
23Billeter, Leçons sur Tchouang-tseu, I, pp. 9–13.
24Ibid., pp. 15ff.: “Ce qui intéresse votre serviteur, c’est le fonctionnement des choses,
non la simple technique.” A similar translation and interpretation may be found in Jean
François Billeter, L’Art chinois de l’écriture. Essai sur la calligraphie, Paris: Skira/Seuil,
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precise; what allowed such a precision is that Billeter used his imagination
to figure out what the cook intended to say. This led him to remember how
children gradually acquire gestural habits, such as filling glasses or cutting
bread. With this method, Zhua¯ngzˇı’s book looses every abstraction, becomes
close to us. Billeter’s thesis about Zhua¯ngzˇı is that his main theme is to
constitute a phenomenology of activity: he describes different kinds and
degrees of activity, from the usual, irreflexive and almost hypnotic25 one to
the most reflexive and conscious one.26 These degrees of activity are kinds
of intentionality: they constitute the way our consciousness relates to the
world. Zhua¯ngzˇı thus describes subjectivity.27 This subjectivity does never
cease, even when Zhua¯ngzˇı teaches how to free oneself from the intentionality
which is commited in our everyday activity:28 “this experience does not make
us discover some upper reality, but the source of our own subjectivity.”29 As
we can see, experience and subjectivity can not be separated in Billeter’s
method.
Trusting experience, Billeter avoids to highlight concepts: he does not
trust words, claiming to follow Wittgenstein’s critic of philosophy as being
fooled by language. Even the term of dào should be almost each time trans-
lated by a different word.30 Zhua¯ngzˇı does not only cease to be a daoist: he
does not even speak of dào any more. His thought is a phenomenology much
more than a daoism.
So, Billeter’s method’s originality is to widely use the notions of subjec-
tivity and experience, each of them sustaining the other. The universality of
subjectivity allows us to have, as an intuition, the experience of what Zhua¯ng-
zˇı thinks, because ancient Chinese and contemporary Swiss people share the
same structures of consciousness. And the universality of experience makes
us understand what special structures of subjectivity are implicitly described
by Zhua¯ngzˇı. Zhua¯ngzˇı does not use the notion of subjectivity, but it does
not prevent him, as a human being, to describe or comment it.
2001 (1989), IX, pp. 269ff. See also Jean François Billeter, “La traduction vue de près”, in:
Études sur Tchouang-tseu, Paris: Allia, 2006, pp. 213–234, especially pp. 220–222, where
Billeter avoids translating “dào” by the word of “Way” in a text from Mencius.
25Jean François Billeter, Études sur Tchouang-tseu, Paris: Allia, 2006 (2004), I, pp. 16–
19; and “Sur l’hypnose,” pp. 235–249.
26Billeter, Leçons sur Tchouang-tseu, II, pp. 41ff.
27Billeter, Études sur Tchouang-tseu, III, p. 106.
28Ibid., III, p. 89, and IV, pp. 129ff.
29Ibid., IV, p. 134.
30Billeter, Leçons sur Tchouang-tseu, I, pp. 37–39.
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2 Is Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı a phenomenologist?
2.1 A phenomenological projection
One can easily see how far Jullien’s method is from Billeter’s. Jullien stud-
ies traditions, Billeter individuals. Jullien follows commentators, Billeter
sidesteps them. Jullien avoids personal interpretation, Billeter claims for
it. Jullien identifies concepts, Billeter avoids them; similarly, Billeter trusts
experience, Jullien is wary of it. Jullien tries to keep an internal unity to his
translations, even though the result may sound strange to us; Billeter prefers
to have an immediately understandable translation, even though the original
lexical field may be lost. So both sinologists could nothing but disagree.
But fortunate to us, they did not content themselves with desagreeing.
They disputed. And this contest has been at least as instructive as their
isolated works already were.
In 1989, Billeter publishes in the French sinological journal Études chi-
noises a review of Jullien’s book Procès ou création.31 At that time, Billeter
still has some respect and admiration for Jullien. He recognizes the great
value of this book from a sinological point of vue,32 writing in particular that
the chapter about the Yìj¯ıng is, “as far as I know, the best thing ever written
in Western sinology about the philosophical interpretation of the Yìj¯ıng.”33
So when Billeter, in 2006, pretends to doubt about Jullien’s sinological value,
the polemic dimension of his judgement should not be forgotten.
After having spoken very highly of Jullien’s book, “from a sinological
point of view,” Billeter comes to criticize it, “from a non-sinological point
of view.” This critic consists in two points. The first one concerns the
use of Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı, not as a singular and original philosopher, but as a
typical Chinese thinker. We have earlier underlined how important it was in
Billeter’s method to isolate thinkers in order to see what was proper to each of
them; this critic is thus not surprising from him. The second critic concerns
Jullien’s reserve about one particular point in Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s thought, which
31Jean François Billeter, “Comment lire Wang Fuzhi ?”, in: Études chinoises IX.1 (Mar.
1989), pp. 95–127, url: http://www.afec-en-ligne.org/IMG/pdf/9-1Billeter.pdf.
32Ibid., pp. 96ff.
33Ibid., pp. 101ff. The controversy of 1989 was not enough to change Billeter’s mind
about Jullien’s competence as a sinologist: in 1993, he still uses superlatives to mention
Jullien’s article “ “Fonder” la morale, ou comment légitimer la transcendance de la moralité
sans le support du dogme ou de la foi — au travers duMencius” (Extrême-Orient Extrême-
Occident, 6, 1985, pp. 23–81), in the review of Jörg Schumacher’s book Über den Begriff des
Nützlichen bei Mengzi : “Il est [...] regrettable qu’il [Jörg Schumacher] ne cite pas l’étude
de François Jullien sur Mencius, qui est à mon sens le meilleur essai de synthèse paru
en langue occidentale, et ne nous dise pas en quoi les résultats de ses propres recherches
complètent, corrigent ou remettent en cause la vision du Mencius proposée par François
Jullien.” See Jean François Billeter, “Jörg Schumacher, Über den Begriff des Nützlichen
bei Mengzi, Berne, 1993”, in: Études chinoises XII.2 (Sept. 1993), pp. 179–181, url: http:
//www.afec-en-ligne.org/IMG/pdf/12-2CR.pdf, pp. 180–181.
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will happen to highlight the very sticking point between Billeter and Jullien.
This particular point is some parallelism Jullien observes in Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s
thought, about the relationship between visible and invisible. For Wáng Fu¯-
zh¯ı, influenced in that by Zha¯ng Zaˇi’s Confucianism more than Zhu¯ Xı¯’s,34
there is no opposition between visible and invisible, but continuity. The uni-
verse is constituted by the qì (氣), the breath of energy, which sometimes
disperses itself, letting things become invisible, and sometimes gathers itself,
making things becoming visible. So there is no opposition between being and
nothingness, but continuity between different kinds of “being” — although
this word is inappropriate, since China neither developped any theory of
“Being,” nor even has an unique word for it. So this kind of transition is
what Jullien calls “process,” as opposed to the European concept of “cre-
ation,” where something may appear ex nihilo. And Jullien contents himself
to indicate a similar process for consciousness described by Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı:
some feelings may at first be very weak, then imperceptibly rise, and finally
be prevailing. They do not magically appear, which would correspond to
“creation,” but gradually rise. And Jullien does not go further about this
parallelism between both kinds of process: the cosmological one and the
psychological one.
This “modesty”35 is precisely what Billeter reproaches Jullien for. Jul-
lien just shows the parallelism, without trying to justify it: he describes
without explaining. Following Billeter, one can not be satisfied with a mere
description. We want to understand, we want the truth. How is it that
Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı assimilates the cosmological and the psychological processes?
How could we justify it? That is to say: how can we come to agree with it?
No understanding without agreeing: this seems to be Billeter’s principle of
method.
To make Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s theory understandable and acceptable, Billeter
develops a theory of projection.36 This cosmologico-psychological process
would first be a merely psychological one, which is then projected onto cos-
mology. This theory of projection leads Billeter to think that Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s
thought is fundamentally a phenomenology. For instance, Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı writes
that the wise, to be effective, must expell all the thoughts while acting. Bil-
leter does not explain it with Chinese commentaries, but with an example
of common life: when trying to hold a stick upright in our hand, we must
not focus on anything, but be aware of the whole activity. If we focus on
the stick or on the hand, we will fail, the stick will fall on the ground.37
This is characteristic of Billeter’s method, explaining difficult texts with an
34Jacques Gernet, La Raison des choses. Essai sur la philosophie de Wang Fuzhi (1619–
1692), NRF Bibliothèque de philosophie, Paris: Gallimard, 2005.
35Billeter, “Comment lire Wang Fuzhi ?”, p. 123.
36It had also been exposed in Billeter, L’Art chinois de l’écriture. Essai sur la calligra-
phie, VI, pp. 145–153.
37Billeter, “Comment lire Wang Fuzhi ?”, pp. 114–115.
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ordinary example. This allows Billeter to interpret Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s philosophy
as a phenomenology of action.
As in Husserl’s phenomenology, Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s describles the structures
of consciousness. But there is a fundamental difference: whereas Husserl’s
phenomenology is reflexive, describing consciousness as consciousness, Wáng
Fu¯zh¯ı’s is not.38 He does not use, nor even know, the lexicon of consciousness.
This phenomenology of action is thus encrypted: that is why projection
plays a role. Having no phenomenological lexicon at his disposal, Wáng Fu¯-
zh¯ı projected his phenomenology onto the external world. He projected onto
the sky (天 tia¯n) the structures of effective consciousness he became aware of
— although he probably was not aware of this projection itself. So, is there
a real parallelism between consciousness and reality? Actually, what Wáng
Fu¯zh¯ı asserts about reality is an indirect way of describing phenomenological
processes.
Some problem could nevertheless rise with this interpretation: it seems
to invert what Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı himself writes. He does not compare the reality
with our cousciousness, but conversely compares our consciousness with the
cosmological process. Consciousness is for him a part of the world, and in
this regard is secondary. There would be no projection from consciousness
to reality, but, on the contrary, influence of the reality on our consciousness.
To escape this objection, Billeter appeals to a “cybernetic loop.”39 “Without
being aware of that, the philosopher observes the projection of these activities
[of common effective consciousness] in the working of the external world.
And this is how the external world becomes for him a model of supreme
activity, on which he judges that human beings are invited to model their own
activity.”40 There is a kind of round-trip, or feedback, between consciousness
and reality. Natural consciousness credits the world with a sort of activity,
and tries to imitate it, without being aware that this type of activity already,
and first, belongs to itself.
A duality appears in Billeter’s analysis, of which he is fully aware: sub-
jectivity plays two roles. It is first an object, since Billeter describes Wáng
Fu¯zh¯ı’s thought as a phenomenology, an inquiry about the structure of con-
sciousness, from a subjective point of view. But it is also a method: “we
are led to conceive Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı’s philosophy through a real phenomenology
of activity and to interpret in return his philosophy starting from this phe-
nomenology of activity.”41 Should we fear some petitio principii? It is indeed
by no mean surprising to find as a result what has been presupposed at first.
But Billeter does not fear this circularity; as well as he speaks about cyber-
netic loop, or feedback, one can see here some kind of hermeneutic circle.
Far from being a mistake, this circularity is claimed for. Thus, adopting a
38Ibid., pp. 111 and 119.
39Ibid., p. 120.
40Ibid., p. 120.
41Ibid., p. 115.
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phenomenological point of view, Billeter’s thought is throughout consistent.
What is the foundation of Billeter’s method in the analysis of Wáng Fu¯-
zh¯ı? Billeter makes no secret of it: we have to postulate the universality
of human experience. Starting from the “possible universality of Wáng Fu¯-
zh¯ı’s philosophy, that is to say the possible adequation to definite universal
data of the reality itself, or of the experience we have of it,”42 Billeter ends
up in asserting that experience is “universal in its principles,” and that “the
elementary data of experience are [...] the ground on which [all philosophers]
necessarily founded their systems.”43 So Billeter rigorously applies to Wáng
Fu¯zh¯ı’s thought the methodological principles of his sinology.
We can for this occasion criticize this following simplistic way of pre-
senting the controversy between Jullien and Billeter; a simplification which
Billeter recently tended to feed.44 It consists in presenting Jullien as a mere
philosopher, Billeter as a mere sinologist. This opposition naturally hides
a value judgement: Billeter would be a patient scientist, having no general
theory about Chinese thought, whereas Jullien would be a philosopher, re-
maining in conceptual abstraction, looking from far away at Chinese texts
and forcing their interpretation. The one would be longsighted, the other
short-sighted. But both parts are false: Billeter’s several times asserted
admiration for Jullien may suffice to attest his competence as a sinologist.
And contrary to what Jullien’s often condescending posture towards Billeter
may let us think,45 Billeter is not less a philosopher. Although more dis-
crete than Jullien, he also has his general theory of China; this theory, as we
can expect, is much different from Jullien’s. There is a “specifically Chinese
propensity to project onto the world the forms of counsciousness in mo-
tion rather than that of the motionless one.”46 Chinese thinkers, especially
Neo-Confucianists,47 but also philosophers like Zhua¯ngzˇı, are phenomenol-
ogists of activity. Whereas “most of Western philosophers sought beyond
the sensible world a motionless reality, attempting to give an account of it
by the mean of conceptual constructions,” “the Chinese philosophers studied
the motion and the transformations of experience.”48 Even more explicitly,
Billeter concludes: “My thesis is that the phenomenology of activity I just
gave an example of constitutes the rational kernel of the thought of many
Chinese philosophers, therefore maybe one of the foundations of Chinese
42Ibid., p. 109.
43Ibid., p. 121.
44Jean François Billeter, Contre François Jullien, Paris: Allia, 2006, p. 45; see also
Jullien, Chemin faisant. Connaître la Chine, relancer la philosophie. Réplique à ***, V,
pp. 43–44 and 49–51.
45Jullien sometimes mentions a “weak thought,” in particular in ibid., ch. XII, pp. 131–
141.
46Billeter, “Comment lire Wang Fuzhi ?”, p. 113.
47Ibid., p. 113.
48Ibid., p. 112.
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thought in general.”49 Billeter’s perspective on Chinese thought is thus not
less ambitious than Jullien’s.
In this respect, how can be interpreted, in Billeter’s system, Jullien’s
work? Not only “modesty,” but more than that, deeper than that: Jullien’s
sinology is a too Western one. Understanding Chinese thought, following
Billeter, implies trusting one’s experience, in order to meet up with Chinese
philosophers on the ground they started from. Thus, interpreting Chinese
thought in a conceptual way, as Jullien does, uproots it, and imports it into
typical Western conceptual thinking. Jullien would therefore not have left
the way of thinking he intended to distance himself from.
Billeter’s review of Jullien’s book is thus much more than a classical
technical review: it is a sinological and philosophical manifesto. Billeter
expresses his methodological principles, and does not only apply them to a
particular Chinese thinker, Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı: but he also applies them to sinology
itself, through Jullien’s work. This reveals a highly systematic spirit, which
exceeds mere sinology.
2.2 Conceptual environment of “projection”
Jullien’s answer is as systematic as Billeter’s critic was.50 As the notion of
projection was the heart of Billeter’s critic of Procès ou création, it will be
Jullien’s main target. Faithful to his methodological bias, Jullien first refuses
to use this concept, arguing that it can not be found anywhere in Wáng Fu¯-
zh¯ı’s writings: “even though Chinese thinkers, and especially Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı,
conceived a definite mode of projection, between “feeling” and “landscape”
(情 qíng and 景 jˇıng, under the name of 寄託 jìtuo¯), it is obvious as well
that, as it is used in Chinese aesthetics, it could not refer to the perspective,
so familiar to us that it became natural, of the speaking subject.”51 Billeter
blamed Jullien for interpreting Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı in a Western way: Jullien turns
the argument against Billeter. The most Western-styled interpretation is not
the one using conceptualization, but the one using the notion of projection.
To avoid intellectual ethnocentrism, we should content ourselves to say that
the parallelism between cosmological and psychological processes is not due
to any projection from consciousness onto the external world, but, literally
following Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı, that consciousness has to imitate the world’s kind of
activity. Everything else would be overinterpretation.
The notion of projection actually conceals a system of concepts and pos-
tulates. First of all, projection, as a phenomenological and psychanalytical
49Ibid., p. 115. See also Billeter, L’Art chinois de l’écriture. Essai sur la calligraphie,
VI, p. 153 and p. 154 n. 4.
50François Jullien, “Lecture ou projection : Comment lire (autrement) Wang Fuzhi ?”,
in: Études chinoises IX.2 (Sept. 1990), pp. 131–149.
51Ibid., p. 142.
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concept, presupposes subjectivity.52 In other words, what in Billeter’s mind
was a hermeneutic circle is now interpreted as a vicious circle. The notion
of activity is also “signed” by Greek philosophy, and does not appear as such
in Chinese tradition.53 Thus, when using phenomenological notions as given
data, “we do not compare two thoughts any more, but adapt the Chinese one
to ours, we project this one onto that one. And Chinese thought is not any
more perceived starting from itself.”54 Jullien’s argument is fully symmetric
with Billeter’s. Both sinologists blame one another for not leaving his own
philosophical tradition, and for projecting onto Chinese thought his own way
of thinking. More than that: as well as Billeter uses the phenomenological
method to criticize Jullien’s abstract conceptual method, Jullien uses the
structural method to criticize Billeter’s. No one of both sinologists can be
blamed for inconsistency: they use the same method to analyze Chinese
texts and to criticize other methods.
At this stage, the controversy can be considered as locked. There is, so
to speak, nothing to add. Arguments have been expressed with so much
symmetry that a state of equilibrium seems to have been reached. The con-
troversy could only continue with details, or with human passions. Probably
for this reason, it had been buried for long years, until Billeter published his
book Contre François Jullien in 2006.
3 Power and subjectivity in China
3.1 Genealogy of an archeology
The new controversy that appeared in 2006 was once again initiated by
Jean François Billeter and is still not closed, both sinologists criticizing one
another, without having to spell things out, in their recent publications.55
The book Contre François Jullien is a critic of the “myth of the alterity
of China,”56 which Jullien would have defended. The blame is both right
and wrong: Jullien has always cared not to exagerate the alterity, and to
criticize the idea of a radical alterity between Chinese thought and European
thought.57 But for sure, Jullien generally paies more attention to differences
than to similarities, considering for practical purposes that the main danger
52Ibid., p. 142.
53Ibid., p. 145.
54Ibid., p. 143.
55See for example Jean François Billeter, “François Jullien, sur le fond”, in: Monde
chinois 11 (Sept. 2007), pp. 67–74; and Jullien, De l’Universel, de l’uniforme, du commun
et du dialogue entre les cultures, pp. 8, 10, 257 and passim.
56Billeter, Contre François Jullien, p. 9.
57See for example François Jullien, La Valeur allusive. Des catégories originales de
l’interprétation poétique dans la tradition chinoise (Contribution à une réflexion sur
l’altérité interculturelle), Quadrige, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003 (1985),
Introduction.
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is the temptation of assimilation more than the excess of distance.
What Billeter refuses is more than this myth: it is the very idea of a
Chinese tradition. He does not contest that something exists like a Chinese
tradition, but refuses the interpretation which is generally given of it, and
Jullien would have relayed. In this respect, adopting a sociological point
of view, Billeter links two aspects of his sinological work: the sociological
method of his book about Lˇı Zhì, and the phenomenological method of his
writings about Zhua¯ngzˇı or Wáng Fu¯zh¯ı.
Billeter intends to expose the genealogy of this myth of alterity. This
myth, which would have influenced Marcel Granet, Victor Segalen or Pierre
Ryckmans, but also Voltaire, came from the Jesuits, who brought an ideology
which would have been made up under the Hàn (漢) dynasty (202 BC).58 At
that time, Chinese mandarines would have “so much exploited the culture
that they recreated it and made of it the ground of the new order.”59 This
myth would thus not only be a mere mistake, but a two millenia old plot.
The goal of this lie was to make the empire look as if it was founded on
nature: “to make people forget the violence and the arbitrary from which the
empire was born, and with the help of which it remained, it had to appear
as complying with the order of things. [...] It was the most effective way
of guaranteeing the durability of the imperial government, of its hierarchies,
of the forms of domination it imposed to people, of the submission they
required. From this general recreation arose what Chinese people considered
since then, and what is still considered, in China and elsewhere, as Chinese
civilization.”60 Highlighting the specificity of Chinese thought, Jullien would
thus be nothing but one more victim of this millenary lie.
Following the young Chinese historian Lˇı Do¯ngju¯n (李冬君),61 Billeter
writes that even the authority of Confucius was artificially built, in order
to submit the self, the subject, to the domination of the political system.62
The imperial Confucianism took root in this kind of political canonization.
Lˇı Do¯ngju¯n concludes that there would only be a real progress when the
individual gets back to the first place.63 We can see here the link with Bil-
leter’s theory of subjectivity: subjectivity is universal, although it may be
recovered or partly masked by oppression. Even when and where it seems
to be absent, the only reason is that it has been repressed. Behind what
Billeter analyzed earlier as a projection, there is a repression.
When Jullien studies Chinese thought as an intellectual tradition, he
58Billeter, op. cit., pp. 9–19.
59Ibid., p. 18. See also Jean François Billeter, “Essai sur l’histoire chinoise, d’après
Spinoza”, in: Chine trois fois muette, Paris: Allia, 2006, pp. 93–143; and Billeter, L’Art
chinois de l’écriture. Essai sur la calligraphie, Postface, pp. 323–324, a text published
in 2001, which already contains almost all arguments of the book Contre François Jullien.
60Billeter, Contre François Jullien, pp. 18–19.
61Ibid., pp. 25ff.
62Ibid., p. 27.
63Ibid., p. 30.
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actually focuses on the very result of a political process: the “relative unifor-
mity” of Chinese thought does not come from a community of ideal struc-
tures, but belongs to political history.64 Even the classical book of Zho¯ngyo¯ng
(中庸), which Jullien translated and commented,65 has a political meaning.66
The whole thought of immanence that Jullien recognizes in Chinese thought
is “linked to the imperial order.”67
Nothing, in Jullien’s method, appears to be innocent. The insistence on
concepts itself belongs to political means. The use of the abstract word of
dào in the eclectic classical book Huáinánzˇı (淮南子) may thus conceal the
real goal of this book, which is to “found on nature the imperial power.”68
Going further than the earlier opposition between phenomenology and a kind
of foucaldian archeology, Billeter intends to write the sociological genealogy
of an archeology. Not only the ancestry of Jullien’s work is suspicious, but
also its descendants: the idea of an alterity of Chinese thought has political
consequences,69 and, in particular, prevents the democratisation of China.70
Going still further, Billeter applies his sociological principles to Jullien
himself: the fascination of French intellectuals for what is called “Chinese
civilization” may be related to the French system of university and grandes
écoles, whose elitism resembles the Chinese mandarinate. However this ar-
gument may legitimately seem to be ad hominem, it has to be linked to the
sociological method of Billeter, and reminds us the way Bourdieu criticized
the tutorial system he came from. So this argument is not only ad hominem,
it is a natural consequence of Billeter’s bias.
3.2 Archeology of a genealogy
In his answer, Jullien criticizes the very idea of an “imperial ideology,”71
inverting the relationship between political ideology and system of thought:
power and lie would not have been enough to impose a way of thinking
for such a long time and so much different eras. Even an ideology must
be founded on a system of thought.72 So, behind genealogical arguments,
archeological ones prevail.
64Ibid., p. 42.
65Jullien, Zhongyong. La Régulation à usage ordinaire.
66Billeter, op. cit., pp. 46–47.
67Ibid., p. 63.
68Ibid., p. 57.
69Ibid., pp. 23ff.
70Ibid., pp. 78–80.
71Jullien, Chemin faisant. Connaître la Chine, relancer la philosophie. Réplique à ***,
XI, pp. 118ff.
72Ibid., XI, p. 123. This may remind Foucault, defending archeology against sociology:
“si l’existence à une groupe social peut toujours expliquer que tel ou tel ait choisi un
système de pensée plutôt que l’autre, la condition pour que ce système ait été pensé ne
réside jamais dans l’existence de ce groupe.” See Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, I, VI,
vi, pp. 213–214.
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Speaking of archeology, which Jullien does not, allows to highlight some
foucaldian influence. Jullien denounces Billeter’s thought as a “human-
ism,” implicitly claiming for the inheritance of French “structuralism:” Lévi-
Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Foucault and Althusser had little in common, but
this little probably was the critic of what they called humanism. Foucault,
in the last pages of Les Mots et les choses, asserted that the concept of
man had just recently been invented in our culture, and may soon disap-
pear; subjectivity would thus not be an universal concept, but an ephemeral
one.73 The very word of humanism, considered as a blame, is enough to
see how far Jullien follows Foucault; but one more evidence is the expres-
sion of “soft humanism” (humanisme mou),74 which appears in 1966 in a
well-known interview with Foucault.75 In Foucault’s book Les Mots et les
choses, phenomenology and sociology belong to the same humanist system
of thought (épistémè).76 Thus even Billeter’s kind of genealogy is interpreted
and criticized in an archeologic way.
Jullien also justifies his use of commentars to study Chinese classics.
Without them, one can not even understand the texts, because of the an-
cient Chinese syntax;77 this is the reason why, attacking Billeter’s rearguard,
Jullien doubts of the possibility to study Zhua¯ngzˇı without their help, with-
out examinating the relationship between this author and Laˇozˇı, Chinese
sophists, Mohists, etc.78 Using commentars avoids us to “blithely project
our fantasy.”79
Defending his conceptual method, Jullien appeals for the “right to con-
cept:”80 “concept definitely is a instrument and abstraction is its result.”81
When we are not aware of it, we may inadvertently project our concepts
— such as reality, being, subjectivity, act — onto heterogenous conceptual
universes.82
Should we conclude of it that there is no universal experience, that we
can not share anything with ancient Chinese thinkers? Absolutely not: the
very existence of sinology shows that a community is possible, not only of
experience, but the “community of the thinkable.”83 Thus Jullien and Billeter
73Ibid., II, X, v–vi, pp. 397–398.
74Jullien, op. cit., p. 15 and XII, pp. 131–141. See also Jullien, De l’Universel, de
l’uniforme, du commun et du dialogue entre les cultures, pp. 8 and 10.
75Michel Foucault, “L’Homme est-il mort ?”, in: Dits et écrits II, 1954–1975, Quarto,
Paris: Gallimard, 2001 (1994), pp. 568–572, especially pp. 568–569.
76About phenomenology, see Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, II, VII, vi, p. 261; II, IX,
iv, pp. 331–332; II, IX, v, pp. 336–338. About sociology, see ibid., II, X, iii, p. 367.
77Jullien, Chemin faisant. Connaître la Chine, relancer la philosophie. Réplique à ***,
VI, p. 56.
78Ibid., VI, p. 57.
79Ibid., VI, pp. 55–56.
80Ibid., VII, pp. 58–69.
81Ibid., VII, p. 68.
82Ibid., VIII, p. 76.
83Ibid., X, p. 101.
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both intend to form a community with ancient Chinese thinkers: but whereas
Billeter founds it on experience and subjectivity, Jullien founds it on concept
and discursive thought.
Conclusion
May we presuppose the universality of subjectivity and experience when
studying ancient Chinese texts?
In philosophy of mathematics, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
happened a controversy about the foundations of mathematics, which first
seemed do be a merely technical one, but much later turned out to require
a philosophical decision. Although arguments of both sinologists are taken
from Chinese tradition, one can wonder whether such documents really may
give any neutral answer, or whether the philosophical debate remains un-
touched.
That any discipline may give up a question and expect from philosophy
an answer is generally a bad sign. When a discipline needs a philosophi-
cal decision to answer a technical question, the technical question may be
considered as buried.
From a philosophical point of vue, one can see that the structure of each
thought is sufficient to make a decision impossible. Not only each of these
sinological thoughts is very systematically structured, but both sinologists
draw in an insightful way the conclusions implied by their theses. Not only
each thought, but also the relationship between both thoughts seems to be
systematic. So it is to fear that one can not answer the question of the
implicit existence of experience and subjectivity in ancient Chinese thought
without having already chosen.
We could maybe transpose into this controversy what Jules Vuillemin
wrote about science and philosophy in general: “no scientific discovery is by
itself able to force a philosophical decision.”84
Final remarks
This text was sent to both sinologists, and Jean François Billeter graced the
author with a detailed answer. Concerning the last point of the text, Mr. Bil-
leter maintains that a thinking system may legitimately be condemned, not
only for inconsistency, but also for its intellectual, moral or political con-
sequences. This point of view was developped in his book Contre François
Jullien.85
84Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009 (1986), IV, 3, p. 132.
85Billeter, op. cit., pp. 7, 43 and 79–80.
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